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Abstract—This paper studies the problem of identifying the
contagion source when partial timestamps of a contagion process
are available. We formulate the source localization problem as
a ranking problem on graphs, where infected nodes are ranked
according to their likelihood of being the source. Two ranking
algorithms, cost-based ranking (CR) and tree-based ranking
(TR), are proposed in this paper. Experimental evaluations
with synthetic and real-world data show that our algorithms
significantly improve the ranking accuracy compared with four
existing algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the problem of identifying the contagion
source when partial timestamps of a contagion process are
available. Contagion processes can be used to model many
real-world phenomena, including rumor spreading in online
social networks, epidemics in human beings, and malware
on the Internet. Informally speaking, locating the source of a
contagion process refers to the problem of identifying a node in
the network that provides the best explanation of the observed
contagion.
This source localization problem has a wide range of
applications. In epidemiology, identifying patient zero can
provide important information about the disease. For example,
in the Cholera outbreak in London in 1854 [1], the spreading
pattern of the Cholera suggested that the water pump located
at the center of the spreading was likely to be the source.
Later, it was confirmed that the Cholera indeed spreads via
contaminated water. In online social networks, identifying the
source can reveal the user who started a rumor or the user
who first announced certain breaking news. For rumors, rumor
source detection helps hold people accountable for their online
behaviors; and for news, the news source can be used to
evaluate the credibility of the news.
While locating contagion sources has these important ap-
plications in practice, the problem is difficult to solve, in
particular, in complex networks. A major challenge is the
lack of complete timestamp information, which prevents us
from reconstructing the spreading sequence to trace back the
source. But on the other hand, even partial timestamps, which
are available in many practical scenarios, provide important
insights about the location of the source. The focus of this
paper is to develop source localization algorithms that utilize
partial timestamp information.
We remark that while this source localization problem
(or called rumor source detection problem) has been studied
recently under a number of different models (see Section I-A
for the details), most of them ignore timestamp information.
As we will see from the experimental evaluations, even limited
timestamp information can significantly improve the accuracy
of locating the source. In this paper, we use a ranking-on-
graphs approach to exploit the timestamp information, and
develop source localization algorithms that perform well on
different networks and under different contagion models. The
main contributions of this paper are summarized below.
(1) We formulate the source localization problem as a rank-
ing problem on graphs, where infected nodes are ranked
according to their likelihood of being the source. Define a
spreading tree to include (i) a directed tree with all infected
nodes and (ii) the complete timestamps of contagion prop-
agation (the detailed definition will be presented in Section
II). Given a spreading tree rooted at node v, denoted by
Pv, we define a quadratic cost C(Pv) depending on the
structure of the tree and the timestamps. The cost of node
v is then defined to be
C(v) = min
Pv
C(Pv), (1)
i.e., the minimum cost among all spreading trees rooted at
node v. Based on the costs and spreading trees, we propose
two ranking methods:
(i) rank the infected nodes in an ascendent order according
to C(v), called cost-based ranking (CR), and
(ii) find the minimum cost spreading tree, i.e.,
P∗ = argmin
P
C(P),
and rank the infected nodes according to their timestamps
on the minimum cost spreading tree, called tree-based
ranking (TR).
(2) The computational complexity of C(v) is very high due to
the large number of possible spreading trees. We prove that
problem (1) is NP-hard by connecting it to the longest-path
problem [22].
(3) We propose a greedy algorithm, named Earliest Infection
First (EIF), to construct a spreading tree to approximate
the minimum cost spreading tree for a given root node v,
denoted by P˜v. The greedy algorithm is designed based
on the minimum cost solution for line networks. EIF first
sorts the infected nodes with observed timestamps in an
CR TR GAU NETSLEUTH ECCE RUM
IAS 0.76 0.68 0.57 0.43 0.15 0.15
PG 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.43 0.43 0.39
TABLE I: The 10%-accuracy under different source localization algorithms with 50% timestamps
ascendent order of the timestamps, and then iteratively
attaches these nodes using a modified breadth-first search
algorithm. In CR, the infected nodes are then ranked based
on C(P˜v); and in TR, the nodes are ranked based on the
complete timestamps of the spreading tree P˜∗ such that
P˜∗ = argminC(P˜v).
We remark that for infected nodes with unknown infection
time, EIF assigns the infection timestamps during the
construction of the spreading tree P˜v. The details can be
found in Section III.
(4) We conducted extensive experimental evaluations using
both synthetic data and real-world social network data (Sina
Weibo1). The performance metric is the probability with
which the source is ranked among top γ percent, named
γ%-accuracy. We have the following observations from the
experimental results:
(i) Both CR and TR significantly outperform existing source
location algorithms in both synthetic data and real-
world data. Table I summarizes the 10%-accuracy in
the Internet autonomous systems (IAS) network and the
power grid (PG) network.
(ii) Our results show that both TR and CR perform well un-
der different contagion models and different distributions
of timestamps.
(iii) Early timestamps are more valuable for locating the
source than recent ones.
(iv) Network topology has a significant impact on the perfor-
mance of source localization algorithms, including both
ours and existing ones. For example, the γ%-accuracy in
the IAS network is lower than that in the PG network
(see Table I for the comparison). This suggests that
the problem is more difficult in networks with small
diameters and hubs than in networks that are locally tree-
like.
A. Related Work
Contagion source detection has received a lot of attention
recently. In [2], [3], Shah and Zaman developed rumor cen-
trality under the susceptible-infected (SI) model, and proved
that rumor centrality is the maximum likelihood estimator for
regular trees. The use of rumor centrality for source detec-
tion has been extended to other scenarios including multiple
sources [4], single source with partial observations [5], single
source with a priori distribution [6], and single source with
multiple infection instants [7]. In [8], Zhu and Ying developed
a sample-path-based approach for detecting the source under
the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model. The sample-
path-based approach has been applied to the SI model with
partial observations [9], SIR model with partial observations
[10], SIS model [11], and SIR model with multiple sources
[12]. Other solutions in the literature include NETSLEUTH, an
1http://www.weibo.com/
eigenvalue-based estimator [13], a dynamic message-passing
algorithm [14] and a minimum-cost-based solution for the SI
model with sparse observations [15]. None of these algorithms
utilize the timestamp information, which is the focus of this
paper.
The work mostly related to ours is [16], which leverages
timestamp information from observers to locate the source. The
algorithm is similar to CR in spirit, but uses the breadth-first
search tree as the spreading tree from a given infected node.
In the IAS network, not only the performance of the algorithm
is worse than ours, the gap also increases significantly as the
amount of timestamps increases (e.g., with 90% timestamps,
the 10%-accuracy of CR is 1 and that of the algorithm in [16]
is only 0.5). We conjecture this is because the spreading trees
constructed by EIF (our algorithm) is far more accurate than
the breadth-first search trees.
Another algorithm that exploits timestamp information is
the simulation-based fast Monte Carlo algorithm [17], which
utilizes multiple snapshots from a set of sparsely placed
nodes. The approach, however, requires the infection time
distributions of all edges, which are difficult to obtain in
practice.
II. A RANKING APPROACH FOR SOURCE LOCALIZATION
Ideally, the output of a source localization algorithm should
be a single node, which matches the source with a high
probability. However, with limited timestamp information, this
goal is too ambitious, if not impossible, to achieve. From
the best of our knowledge, almost all evaluations using real-
world networks show that the detection rates of existing source
localization algorithms are very low [2], [4], [8], [12], where
the detection rate is the probability that the detected node is
the source.
When the detection rate is low, instead of providing a single
source estimator, a better and more useful output of a source
localization algorithm would be a node ranking, where nodes
are ordered according to their likelihood of being the source.
With such a ranking, further investigation can be conducted to
locate the source. More accurate the ranking, less amount of
resources is needed in the further investigation.
In this paper, we assume the input of a source localization
algorithm includes the following information:
• A network G(V , E): The network is an unweighted and
directed graph. A node v in the network represents a
physical entity (such as a user of an online social network,
a human being, or a mobile device). A directed edge
e(v, u) from node v to node u indicates that the contagion
can be transmitted from node v to node u.
• A set of infected nodes I: An infected node is a node
that involves in the contagion process, e.g., a twitter user
who retweeted a specific tweet, a computer infected by
malware, etc. We assume I includes all infected nodes in
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Fig. 1: An Example Illustrating Available Information and a Spreading Tree
the contagion. So I forms a connected subgraph of G. In
the case I includes only a subset of infected nodes, our
source localization algorithms rank the observed infected
nodes according to their likelihood of being the earliest
infected node. More discussion can be found in Section
VI.
• Partial timestamps τ : τ is a |V|-dimensional vector such
that τv = ⋆ if the timestamp is missing and otherwise, τv
is the time at which node v was infected. We remark that
the time here is the normal clock time, not the relative
time with respect to the infection time of the source. Note
that in most cases, the infection time of the source is as
difficult to know as the location of the source.
Figure 1a is a simple example showing the available
information. The nodes in orange are the infected nodes. The
time next to a node is the associated timestamp. We define
a spreading tree P = (T , t) to be a directed tree T with
a |T |-dimensional vector t. The directed tree T specifies
the sequence of infection and the vector t specifies the time
at which each infection occurs. We further require the time
sequence t of a spreading tree to be feasible such that the
infection time of a node is larger than its parent’s, and to be
consistent with the partial timestamps τ such that tv = τv if
τv 6= ⋆. Figure 1b shows a spreading tree that is feasible and
consistent with the observation shown in Figure 1a. Note that,
for simplicity, we omitted the date in the figure by assuming
all events occur on the same day. The timestamps in black are
the observed timestamps and the ones in blue are assigned by
us. Denote by L(I, τ ) the set of spreading trees that are both
feasible and consistent with the partial timestamps.
A. Quadratic cost and sample path approach
Given a spreading tree P = (T , t) ∈ L(I, τ ), we define
the cost of the tree to be
C(P) =
∑
(v,w)∈T
(tw − tv − µ)2, (2)
for some constant µ > 0. This quadratic cost function is
motivated by the following model.
For each edge (v, w) ∈ T , assume that the time it takes
for node v to infect node w follows a truncated Gaussian
distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. Then given a
spreading tree P , the probability density associated with time
sequence t is
fP(t) =
∏
(v,w)∈T
1
Z
√
2πσ
exp
(
− (tw − tv − µ)
2
2σ2
)
, (3)
where Z is the normalization constant. Therefore, the log-
likelihood is
log fP(t)
=− |E(T )| log(Z
√
2πσ)− 1
2σ2
∑
(v,w)∈T
(tw − tv − µ)2,
where |E(T )| is the number of edges in the tree. Therefore,
given a tree T , the log-likelihood of time sequence t is
inversely proportional to the quadratic cost defined in (2). The
lower the cost, more likely the time sequence occurs.
Now given an infected node in the network, the cost of the
node is defined to be minimum cost among all spreading trees
rooted at the node. Using Pv to denote a spreading tree rooted
at node v, the cost of node v is
C(v) = min
Pv∈L(I,τ)
C(Pv). (4)
After obtaining C(v) for each infected node v, the in-
fected nodes can be ranked according to either C(v) or the
timestamps of the minimum cost spreading tree. However, the
calculation of C(v) in a general graph is NP-hard as shown
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Problem (4) is an NP-hard problem. 
Remark 1: This theorem is proved by showing that the
longest-path problem can be solved by solving (4). The de-
tailed analysis is presented in the appendix. Since computing
the exact value of C(v) is difficult, we present a greedy
algorithm in the next section.
III. EIF: A GREEDY ALGORITHM
In this section, we present a greedy algorithm, named
Earliest-Infection-First (EIF), to solve problem (4). Note that
if a node’s observed infection time is larger than some other
node’s observed infection time, then it cannot be the source.
So we only need to compute cost C(v) for node v such that
τv = ⋆ or τv = minu:τu 6=⋆ τu. Furthermore, when all infected
nodes are known, we can restrict the network to the subnetwork
formed by the infected nodes to run the algorithm. We next
present the algorithm, together with a simple example in Figure
2 for illustration. In the example, all edges are bidirectional,
so the arrows are omitted, and the network in Figure 2 is the
subnetwork formed by all infected nodes.
Earliest-Infection-First (EIF)
1) Step 1: The algorithm first estimates µ from τ using the
average per-hop infection time. Let lvw denote the length
of the shortest path from node v to node w, then
µ =
∑
τv 6=⋆,τw 6=⋆,v 6=w
|τv − τw|∑
τv 6=⋆,τw 6=⋆,v 6=w
lvw
.
Example: Given the timestamps shown in Figure 2, µ =
36.94 minutes.
2) Step 2: Sort the infected nodes in an ascending order
according to the observed infection time τ . Let α denote
the ordered list such that α1 is the node with the earliest
infection time.
Example: Consider the example in Figure 2. The ordered
list is
α = (6, 12, 13, 1).
3) Step 3: Construct the initial spreading tree T0 that includes
the root node only and set the cost to be zero.
Example: Assuming we want to compute the cost of node
10 in Figure 2, we first have T0 = {10} and C(10) = 0.
4) Step 4: At the kth iteration, node αk is added to the
spreading tree Tk−1 using the following steps.
Example: At 3rd iteration, the current spreading tree is
10→ 6→ 7→ 8→ 12,
and the associated timestamps are given in Table II. Note
that these timestamps are assigned by EIF except those
observed ones. The details can be found in the next step. In
the 3rd iteration, node 13 needs to be added to the spreading
tree.
node ID 10 6 7 8 12
Timestamp 5:28 6:05 6:45 7:25 8:05
TABLE II: The timestamps on the spreading tree in the 3rd
iteration
(a) For each node m on the spreading tree Tk−1, identify
a modified shortest path from node m to node αk. The
modified shortest path is a path that has the minimum
number of hops among all paths from node m to node
αk, which satisfy the following two conditions:
◦ it does not include any nodes on the spreading tree
Tk−1, except node m; and
◦ it does not include any nodes on list α, except node
αk.
Example: The modified shortest path from node 7 to
node 13 is
7→ 9→ 13.
There is no modified shortest path from node 12 to node
13 since all paths from 12 to 13 go through node 8 that
is on the spreading tree T2.
(b) For the modified shortest path from node m to node αk,
the cost of the path is defined to be
γm = l˜αkm
(
tαk − tm
l˜αkm
− µ
)2
,
where l˜αkm denotes the length of the modified shortest
path from m to αk. From all nodes on the spreading tree
Tk−1, select node m∗ with the minimum cost i.e.,
m∗ = argmin
m
γm.
Example: The costs of the modified shortest paths to the
nodes on the spreading tree
10→ 6→ 7→ 8→ 12
are shown in Table III. Node 7 has the smallest cost.
node ID 10 6 7 8 12
cost 15,640.00 ∞ 61.83 147.03 ∞
TABLE III: The costs of the modified shortest paths
(c) Construct a new spreading tree Tk by adding the modified
shortest path from m∗ to αk. Assume node g on the
newly added path is hg hops from node m∗, the infection
time of node g is set to be
tg = tm∗ + (hg − 1) tαk − tm∗
l˜m∗αk
. (5)
The cost is updated to C(v) = C(v) + γm∗ .
Example: At the 3rd iteration, the timestamp of node 9
is set to be 7:28 PM, and the cost is updated to C(10) =
89.92.
5) Step 5: For those infected nodes that have not been added to
the spreading tree, add these nodes by using a breadth-first
search starting from the spreading tree T . When a new
node (say node w) is added to the spreading tree during
the breadth-first search, the infection time of the node is
set to be tpw + µ, where pw is the parent of node w on
the spreading tree. Note that the cost C(v) does not change
during this step because tw − tpw − µ = 0.
Example: The final spreading tree and the associated
timestamps are presented in Figure 2.
Remark 2: The timestamps of nodes on a newly added
path are assigned according to equation (5). This is because
such an assignment is the minimum cost assignment in a line
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1st iteration of step 4: The blue edge is the modified 
shortest path from node 10 to node 6. After attaching 
node 6, the infection time of node 10 is assigned to 
6:05PM -37 min = 5:28 PM. The cost of the spreading 
tree after iteration 1 is 0.
2nd iteration of step 4: The path formed by blue edges is 
the  modified shortest path from node 6 to node 12. There
is no modified shortest path from node 10 to node 12. After 
attaching node 12, the infection time of node 7 and 8 is 
assigned according to equation (5). The cost of the spreading
tree after iteration 2 is 28.09.
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3rd iteration of step 4: There are three possible modified 
shortest paths from the current spreading tree to node 13 
(formed by the blue edges). The associated costs are
Path 7-9-13 is added to the spreading tree and the cost
of the spreading tree after iteration 3 is 89.92.
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4th iteration of step 4: The costs of the three modified 
shortest paths to node 1 are listed below.
Path 7-4-5-1 is added to the spreading tree and the cost
of the spreading tree after iteration 4 is 1,685.21. 
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Step 5: Expanding the spreading tree using the 
breadth-first search to include all infected nodes. 
The blue edges are newly added edges.
The cost of this spreading tree (i.e., the cost of 
node 10) is 1,685.21. 
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Fig. 2: An Example for Illustrating Step 4 and Step 5 of EIF. The paths formed by blue edges are modified shortest paths. The
trees formed by red edges are the spreading trees at the beginning of each iteration.
network in which only the timestamps of two end nodes are
known.
Lemma 2: Consider a line network with n infected nodes.
Assume the infection time of node 1 and node n is known
and the infection time of the rest nodes is not. Furthermore,
assume τ1 < τn. The quadratic cost defined in (4) is minimized
by setting
tk = τ1 + (k − 1)τn − τ1
n− 1 (6)
for 1 < k < n. 
Note that under the assignment above, the infection time,
τk+1 − τk, is the same for all edges, which is due to the
quadratic form of the cost function. The detailed proof can
be found in the appendix.
Remark 3: Note that in Step 4(a), we use the modified
shortest path instead of the conventional shortest path. The
purpose is to avoid inconsistence when assigning timestamps.
For example, consider the 3rd iteration in Figure 2, and the
paths from node 7 to node 2. There are two conventional
shortest paths: 7 → 4 → 5 → 1 and 7 → 8 → 5 → 1. If
we select path 7 → 8 → 5 → 1 and assign the timestamps
according to (5), then the infection time of node 8 is larger
that of node 7, which contradicts the current timestamps of
node 7 and node 8. Therefore, 7→ 8→ 5→ 1 should not be
selected.
Remark 4: A key step of EIF is the construction of the
modified shortest paths from the nodes on Tk−1 to node αk.
This can be done by constructing a modified breadth-first
search tree starting from node αk. In constructing the modified
breadth-first search tree, we first reverse the direction of all
edges as we want to construct paths from the nodes on Tk−1
to node αk. Then starting from node αk, nodes are added in a
breadth-first fashion. However, a branch of the tree terminates
when the tree meets a node on Tk−1 or node αl for l > k.
After obtainng the modified breadth-first search tree, if a leaf
node is a node on Tk−1, say node m, then the reversed path
from node αk to node m on the modified breadth-first search
tree is a modified shortest path from node m to node αk. If
none of the leaf nodes is on Tk−1, then the cost of adding αk
is claimed to be infinity. In Figure 2, the trees formed by the
blue edges are the modified breadth-first trees at each iteration.
IV. COST-BASED AND TREE-BASED RANKING
Denote by T˜v the spreading tree constructed under EIF for
node v, and C˜(T˜v) the corresponding cost computed by EIF.
After constructing the spreading tree for each infected node
and obtaining the corresponding cost, the nodes are ranked
using the following two approaches.
Cost-Based Ranking (CR): Rank the infected nodes in an
ascendent order according to C˜(T˜v).
Tree-Based Ranking (TR): Denote by v∗ = argminv C˜(T˜v).
Rank the infected nodes in an ascendent order according to
the timestamps on T˜v∗ .
Theorem 3: The complexity of CR and TR is
O(|α||I||EI |), where |α| is the number of infected nodes with
observed timestamps, |I| is the number of infected nodes,
and |EI | is the number of edges in the subgraph formed by
the infected nodes. 
The proof is presented in the appendix.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of TR and CR
using both synthetic data and real-world data.
A. Performance of EIF on a Small Network
In the first set of simulations, we evaluated the performance
of EIF of solving the minimum cost of the feasible and
consistent spreading trees. Given an observation I and τ ,
denote by C∗ the minimum cost of the feasible and consistent
spreading trees. Then
C∗ = min
P∈L(I,τ)
C(P)
Denote by C˜∗ the minimum cost of the spreading trees
obtained under EIF. We evaluated the approximation ratio
r = C˜
∗
C∗
on a small network — the Florentine families
network [18] which has 15 nodes and 20 edges. Recall that
the minimum cost problem is NP-hard, so the approximation
ratio is evaluated over a small network only. To compute the
actual minimum cost, we first enumerated all possible spanning
trees using the algorithm in [19], and then computed the
minimum cost of each spanning tree by solving the quadratic
programming problem.
In this experiment, we assumed the infection time of each
edge follows a truncated Gaussian distribution with µ = 100
and σ = 100. We evaluated the approximation ratio when
the number of observed timestamps varied from 5 to 14. The
results are shown in Figure 3, where each data point is an
average of 500 runs. The approximation ratio is 2.24 with 5
timestamps, 1.5 with 8 timestamps and becomes 1.08 when
14 timestamps are given. This experiment shows that EIF
approximates the minimum cost solution reasonably well.
B. Comparison with Other Algorithms
We first tested the algorithms using synthetic data on
two real-world networks: the Internet Autonomous Systems
network (IAS)2 and the power grid network (PG)3:
• The IAS network is a network of the Internet autonomous
systems inferred from Oregon route-views on March,
31st, 2001. The network contains 10,670 nodes and
2Available at http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html
3Available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/∼mejn/netdata/
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22,002 edges in the network. IAS is a small world
network.
• The PG network is a network of Western States Power
Grid of United States. The network contains 4,941 nodes
and 6,594 edges. Compared to the IAS network, the PG
network is locally tree-like.
We first compare CR and TR with the following four
existing source localization algorithms.
• Rumor centrality (RUM): Rumor centrality was proposed
in [2], and is the the maximum likelihood estimator on
trees under the SI model. RUM ranks the infected nodes in
an ascendent order according to nodes’ rumor centrality.
• Infection eccentricity (ECCE): The infection eccentricity
of a node is the maximum distance from the node to any
infected node in the graph, where the distance is defined
to be the length of the shortest path. The node with the
smallest infection eccentricity, named Jordan infection
center, is the optimal sample-path-based estimator on
tree networks under the SIR model [8]. ECCE ranks
the infected nodes in a descendent order according to
infection eccentricity.
• NETSLEUTH: NETSLEUTH was proposed in [13]. The
algorithm constructs a submatrix of the infected nodes
based on the graph Laplacian of the network and then
ranks the infected nodes according to the eigenvector
corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the submatrix.
• Gaussian heuristic (GAU): Gaussian heuristic is an algo-
rithm proposed in [16], which utilizes partial timestamp
information. The algorithm is similar to CR in spirit, but
uses the breadth-first search tree as the spreading tree for
each infected node.
In the four algorithms above, RUM, ECCE, and NETSLEUTH
only use topological information of the network, and do
not exploit the timestamp information. GAU utilizes partial
timestamp information.
In this set of experiments, we assume the infection time of
each infection follows a truncated Gaussian distribution with
µ = {1, 10, 100} and σ = 100. In each simulation, a source
node was chosen uniformly across node degree to avoid the
bias towards small degree nodes (In the IAS network, 3,720
out of the 10,670 nodes have degree one). In particular, the
nodes were grouped into M bins such that the nodes in the
mth bin (1 ≤ m ≤ M − 1) have degree m and the nodes in
the M th bin have degree ≥ M . In each simulation, we first
randomly and uniformly picked a bin, and then randomly and
uniformly pick a node from the selected bin. We simulated
the contagion process and terminated the process when having
200 infected nodes. For the IAS network, we chose M = 20;
and for the PG network, we chose M = 10. Note that we had
more bins in the IAS network than in the PG network because
the degree distribution of the IAS network is heavily tailed
and the maximum degree is 2,312. The maximum degree of
the PG network is only 19.
We selected 50% infected nodes (100 nodes) and revealed
their infection time. The source node was always excluded
from these 100 nodes so that the infection time of the source
node was always unknown. We repeated the simulation 500
times to compute the average γ%-accuracy.
The results on the IAS and PG networks are presented in
Figure 4 where the performance are consistent for different µ
values. Recall that RUM, ECCE and NETLEUTH only use
topological information.
• Observation 1: In both networks, CR and TR perform
much better than the other algorithms in the IAS net-
work. In PG network, TR, CR and GAU have similar
performance which dominates other algorithms due to the
utilization of the timestamp information. In particular, in
the IAS network, the 10%-accuracy of CR is 0.76 while
10%-accuracy of GAU and NETSLEUTH is 0.57 and
0.43, respectively when µ = 100.In the PG network,
the 10%-accuracy of TR is 0.99 while that of GAU and
NETSLEUTH is 0.98 and 0.43, respectively.
• Observation 2: Most algorithms, except NETSLEUTH,
have higher γ%-accuracy in the PG network than in the
IAS network. We conjecture that it is because the IAS
network has a small diameter and contains hub nodes
while the PG network is more tree-like.
• Observation 3: NETSLEUTH dominates ECCE and
RUM in the IAS network, but performs worse than ECCE
and RUM in the PG network when γ ≤ 10. Furthermore,
while all other algorithms have higher γ-accuracy in IAS
than in PG, NETSLEUTH has lower γ-accuracy in IAS
than in PG when γ < 10. A similar phenomenon will be
observed in a later simulation as well.
• Observation 4: CR performs better in the IAS network
when γ ≥ 5 while TR performs better in the PG network.
C. The Impact of Timestamp Distribution
In the previous set of simulations, the revealed timestamps
were uniformly chosen from all timestamps except the times-
tamp of the source, which was always excluded. We call this
unbiased distribution. In this set of experiments, we study the
impact of the distribution of the timestamps. We compared the
unbiased distribution with a distribution under which nodes
with larger infection time are selected with higher probability.
In particular, we selected nodes iteratively. Let N k denote the
set of remaining infected nodes after selecting k nodes, then
the probability that node i is selected in the next step is
p
(k)
i =
ti − ts∑
j∈Nk(tj − ts)
,
where ts is the infection time of the source. We call this time
biased distribution.
In this section, we evaluated the performance of our algo-
rithms and GAU with different sizes of observed timestamps
and different distributions of the observed timestamps. All
the experiment setups are the same as in Section V-B. We
evaluate the algorithms with µ = {1, 10, 100} and the results
of different number of timestamps are shown in Figure 5.
Note that the performance of RUM, ECCE and NET-
SLEUTH are independent of timestamp distribution and size,
so we did not include these algorithms in the figures. From
the figure, we have the following observations:
• Observation 5: We varied the size of observed times-
tamps from 10% to 90%. As we expected, the γ%-
accuracy increases as the size increases under both CR
and TR. Interestingly, in the IAS network, the 10%-
accuracy of GAU is worse than TR and CR when more
than 20% of the timestamps are observed. We conjecture
this is because in small world networks such as the IAS
network, the spreading tree is very different from the
breadth-first search tree rooted at the source. Since GAU
always uses the breadth-first search trees regardless of
the size of timestamps, more timestamps do not result
in a more accurate spreading tree. The spreading tree
constructed by EIF, on the other hand, depends on the
size of timestamps and is more accurate as the size of
timestamps increases.
• Observation 6: In both networks, the time-biased dis-
tribution results in 5% to 15% reduction of the γ%-
accuracy. This shows that earlier timestamps provide more
valuable information for locating the source. However, the
trends and relative performance of the three algorithms
are similar to those in the unbiased case.
• Observation 7: CR performs better in the IAS network
when the timestamp size is larger than 40%; and TR
performs better in the PG network.
• Observation 8: The γ%-accuracy is much higher in the
PG network than that in the IAS network under both
the unbiased distribution and time-biased distribution. For
example, with the time-biased distribution and 20% of
timestamps, the 10%-accuracy of TR is 0.87 in PG and
is only 0.52 in IAS when µ = 100. This again confirms
that the source localization problem is more difficult in
networks with small diameters and hub nodes.
D. The Impact of the Diffusion Model
In all previous experiments, we used the truncated Gaussian
model for contagion. We now study the robustness of CR and
TR to the contagion models. We conducted the experiments
using the IC model [20] and SpikeM model [21] for contagion.
Both models are time slotted, so are very different from the
truncated Gaussian model. In the IC model, each infected
node has only one chance to infect each of its neighbors. If
the infection failed, the node cannot make more attempts. In
the experiments, the infection probability along each edge is
selected with a uniform distribution over (0, 1). SpikeM model
has been shown to match the patterns of real-world information
diffusion well. In the SpikeM model, infected nodes become
less infectious as the increase of the time. Furthermore, the
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(b) The IAS network with µ = 10
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(c) The IAS network with µ = 100
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(d) The PG network with µ = 1
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(e) The PG network with µ = 10
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(f) The PG network with µ = 100
Fig. 4: Comparison with Existing Algorithms with 50% timestamps
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Timestamp Size (%)
10
%
−a
cc
ur
ac
y
 
 
CR − unbiased
CR − time biased
TR − unbiased
TR − time biased
GAU − unbiased
GAU − time biased
(a) The IAS network with µ = 1
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(b) The IAS network with µ = 10
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(c) The IAS network with µ = 100
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(d) The PG network with µ = 1
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(e) The PG network with µ = 10
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Timestamp Size (%)
10
%
−a
cc
ur
ac
y
 
 
CR − unbiased
CR − time biased
TR − unbiased
TR − time biased
GAU − unbiased
GAU − time biased
(f) The PG network with µ = 100
Fig. 5: The Impacts of the Distribution and Size of Timestamps
activity level of a user in different time periods of a day varies
to match the rise and fall patterns of information diffusion
in the real world. In our experiments, we used the parameter
set C5 in Table 3 of [21] which was obtained based on
MemeTracker dataset. The results are shown in Figure 6, where
in each figure, the size of timestamps varies from 10% to 90%.
• Observation 9: Under both the IC and SpikeM models,
the GAU algorithm has a better performance when less
than 20% timestamps are observed in the IAS network.
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(a) The IAS Network under the IC Model
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(b) The IAS Network under the SpikeM Model
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(c) The PG Network under the IC Model
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(d) The PG Network under the SpikeM Model
Fig. 6: The Performance of CR, TR and GAU under different diffusion models
The performance of TR and CR dominate GAU when
more than 20% timestamps are observed. For the PG
network, the performances of TR and CR are better than
GAU under th IC model, and the performance of TR is
better than GAU under the SpikeM model.
Remark 5: Another popular diffusion model is the Linear
Threshold (LT) model [20]. However, in the experiments, we
found that it is difficult for a single source to infect more than
150 nodes under the LT model. Therefore, we only conducted
experiments with the IC model.
E. The Impact of Network Topology
In the previous simulations, we have observed that locating
the source in the PG network is easier than in the IAS
network. We conjecture that it is because the IAS network
is a small-world network while the PG network is more tree-
like. To verify this conjecture, we removed edges from the
IAS network to observe the change of γ%-accuracy as the
number of removed edges increases. For each removed edge,
we randomly picked one edge and removed it if the network
remains to be connected after the edge is removed. We used
the truncated Gaussian model and all other settings are the
same as those in Section V-B. The results are shown in Figure
7.
• Observation 10: After removing 11,000 edges, the ratio
of the number of edges to the number of nodes is
11, 002/10, 670 = 1.03, so the network is tree-like. As
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Fig. 7: The γ%-Accuracy as the Number of Removed Edges
Increases
showed in Figure 7, the 5%-accuracy of all algorithms,
except NETSLEUTH, improves as the number of the
removed edges increases, which confirms our conjecture.
The 5%-accuracy of NETSLEUTH starts to decrease
when the number of removed edges is more than 6, 000.
This is consistent with the observation we had in Figure
4, in which the 5% accuracy of NETSLUETH in PG is
worse than that in IAS.
F. Weibo Data Evaluation
In this section, we evaluated the performance of our
algorithms with real-world network and real-world information
spreading. The dataset is the Sina Weibo4 data, provided by
the WISE 2012 challenge5. Sina Weibo is the Chinese version
of Twitter, and the dataset includes a friendship graph and a
set of tweets.
The friendship graph is a directed graph with 265,580,802
edges and 58,655,849 nodes. The tweet dataset includes
369,797,719 tweets. Each tweet includes the user ID and post
time of the tweet. If the tweet is a retweet of some tweet, it
includes the tweet ID of the original tweet, the user who post
the original tweet, the post time of the original tweet, and the
retweet path of the tweet which is a sequence of user IDs.
For example, the retweet path a → b → c means that user b
retweeted user a’s tweet, and user c retweeted user b’s.
We selected the tweets with more than 1,500 retweets. For
each tweet, all users who retweet the tweet are viewed as
infected nodes and we extracted the subnetwork induced by
these users. We also added those edges on the retweet paths to
the subnetwork if they are not present in the friendship graph,
by treating them as missing edges in the friendship network.
The user who posts the original tweet is regarded as the source.
If there does not exist a path from the source to an infected
node along which the post time is increasing, the node was
removed from the subnetwork. In addition, to make sure we
have enough timestamps, we remove the samples with less
than 30% timestamps.
After the above preprocessing, we have 1,170 tweets with
at least 30% observed timestamps. Similar to section V-B in
the paper, we grouped the tweets into five bins according
the degree of the source in the friendship graph. In the kth
bin (for k = 1, 2, 3, 4), the degree of the source is between
8000(k − 1) to 8000k − 1. In the 5th bin, the degree of
the source is at least 32, 000. The number of tweets in the
bins are [568 147 70 68 317]. From each bin, we draw
30 samples without replacement. For completeness, we also
evaluated the performance with all 1,170 tweets. The results
are summarized in Figure 8. Figure 8a shows the performance
with all tweets samples and Figure 8b shows the performance
if we resample the tweets by the above degree bins. The
observed timestamps are uniformly selected from the available
timestamps and the source node is excluded.
• Observation 11: Figure 8 shows that CR and TR dom-
inates GAU with both 10% and 30% of timestamps. In
particular for the resample by degree case, TR performs
very well and dominates all other algorithms with a large
margin. The 10%-accuracy of TR with 30% timestamps
is around 0.64 while that of CR is 0.53 and that of
NETSLEUTH is only 0.4.
Summary: From the synthetic data and real data evalua-
tions, we have seen that both TR and CR perform better than
existing algorithms, and are robust to diffusion models and
4http://www.weibo.com/
5http://www.wise2012.cs.ucy.ac.cy/challenge.html
4
3
2
1
5
Fig. 11: The Subnetwork before Modification
4
3
2
1
5
Fig. 12: The Subnetwork after Including Information 6→ 7
timestamp distributions. Furthermore, TR performs better than
CR in most cases. CR performs better than TR only in the
IAS network when the sample size is large (≥ 30% under
the truncated Gaussian diffusion, ≥ 50% under the IC model
and ≥ 70% under the SpikeM model). Therefore, we would
recommend TR for general cases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
In this paper, we studied the problem of locating the
contagion source with partial timestamps. We developed two
ranking algorithms, CR and TR. Experimental evaluations on
synthetic and real-world data demonstrated that CR and TR
improve the ranking accuracy significantly compared with
existing algorithms, and perform well in real-world networks.
A. Partially Observed Infected Nodes
In Section II, we assumed that I includes all infected
nodes. This, however, is not a critical assumption. When I
only includes a subset of infected nodes, call them observed
infected nodes, CR and TR can be used to rank these nodes
according to their likelihood of being the earliest observed
infected node. Using the setting in Section V-D (the SpikeM
model) and assuming 80% of infected nodes are observed,
figures 9 and 10 show the γ%-accuracy of CR and TR for
locating the earliest observed infection nodes in the IAS and
PG networks under the unbiased timestamps distribution. We
can see that the performance is similar to Figures 6b and 6d.
This demonstrates that our algorithm could be applied to the
scheme where partially infected nodes are observed.
B. Other Side Information
In some practical scenarios, we may have other side infor-
mation than timestamps such as who infected whom. This side
information can be incorporated in the algorithm by modifying
the network G. Consider the example in Figure 11. If we know
that node 2 was infected by node 3, then we can removed all
incoming edges to node 2, except 3→ 2, and the edge 2→ 3
to obtain a modified G as shown in Figure 12. We can then
apply CR and TR on the modified graph to rank the observed
infected nodes.
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Fig. 8: Performance on Weibo Data
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Timestamp Size (%)
10
%
−a
cc
ur
ac
y
 
 
CR
TR
Fig. 9: The Performance of CR, TR in the IAS Network under
the SpikeM Model with Partially Observed Infected Nodes
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Assume all nodes in the network are infected nodes and
the infection time of two nodes (say node v and node w)
are observed. Without loss of generality, assume τv < τw.
Furthermore, assume the graph is undirected (i.e., all edges
are bidirectional) and
|τv − τw| ≥ µ|I|.
We will prove the theorem by showing that computing the cost
of node v is related to the longest path problem between nodes
v and w.
To compute C(v), we consider those spreading trees rooted
at node v. Given a spreading tree P = T , t rooted at node v,
denote by Q(v, w) the set of edges on the path from node v
to node w. The cost of the spreading tree can be written as
C(P) =
∑
(h,u)∈E(T )\Q(v,w)
(tu − th − µ)2 (7)
+
∑
(h,u)∈Q(v,w)
(tu − th − µ)2 (8)
Recall that only the infection time of nodes v and w are
known. Furthermore, nodes v and w will not both appear on
a path in T \Q(v, w). Therefore, by choosing τu− τh = µ for
each (h, u) ∈ E(T )\Q(v, w), we have
(7) = 0.
Next applying Lemma 2, we obtain that
(8) ≥ |Q(v, w)|
(
τw − τv
|Q(v, w)| − µ
)2
, (9)
where the equality is achieved by assigning the timestamps
according to Lemma 2.
For fixed |τw − τv| and µ, we have
∂(9)
∂|Q(v, w)| = µ
2 −
(
τw − τv
|Q(v, w)|
)2
<(a) µ
2 −
(
µ|I|
|Q(v, w)|
)2
<(b) µ
2 −
(
µ|I|
|I|
)2
= 0,
where inequality (a) holds because of the assumption τw −
τv > µ|I| and inequality (b) is due to |Q(v, w)| ≤ |I| − 1.
So (9) is a decreasing function of |Q(v, w)| (the length of the
path).
Let η denote the length of the longest path between v and
w. Given the longest path between v and w, we can construct
a spreading tree P∗ by generating T ∗ using the breadth-first
search starting from the longest path and assigning timestamps
t
∗ as mentioned above. Then,
C(v) = C(P∗) = min
Pv∈L(I,τ)
C(Pv) = η
(
τw − τv
η
− µ
)2
. (10)
Therefore, the algorithm that computes C(v) can be used
to find the longest path between nodes v and w. Since the
longest path problem is NP-hard [22], the calculation of C(v)
must also be NP-hard.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Define xk,k−1 = tk − tk−1, so the cost C can be written
as
C(x) =
n∑
k=2
(tk − tk−1 − µ)2 =
n∑
k=2
(xk,k−1 − µ)2.
The cost minimization problem can be written as
minC(x) =
∑n
k=2(xk,k−1 − µ)2 (11)
subject to: ∑nk=2 xk,k−1 = tn − t1 (12)
xk,k−1 ≥ 0. (13)
Note that C(x) is a convex function in x. By verifying the
KKT condition, it can be shown that the optimal solution to
the problem above is xk,k−1 = τn−τ1n−1 , which implies tk =
τ1 + (k − 1) τn−τ1n−1 .
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Note that the complexity of the modified breadth first
search is O(|EI |) since each edge in the subgraph formed by
the infected nodes only needs to be considered once. We next
analyze the complexity of EIF:
• Step 1: The complexity of computing the paths from an
infected node to all other infected nodes is O(|EI |). Given
|α| infected nodes with timestamps, the computational
complexity of Step 1 is O(|α||EI |).
• Step 2: The complexity of sorting a list of size |α| is
O(|α| log(|α|)).
• Steps 3 and 4: To construct the spreading tree for a given
node, |α| infected nodes need to be attached in Steps
3 and 4. Each attachment requires the construction of a
modified breadth-first tree, which has complexity O(|EI |).
So the overall computational complexity of Steps 3 and
4 is O(|α||EI |).
• Step 5: The breadth-first search algorithm is needed
to complete the spreading tree, which has complexity
O(|EI |).
From the discussion above, we can conclude that the compu-
tational complexity of constructing the spreading tree from a
given node and calculating the associated cost is O(|α||EI |).
CR (or TR) repeats EIF for each infected node, with com-
plexity O(|α||I||EI |), and then sort the infected nodes, with
complexity O(|I| log |I|). Therefore, the overall complexity of
CR (or TR) is O(|α||I||EI |).
